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#2A - 2/25/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NORMA LEMOINE, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10410 
LOCAL 1655, DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
ROBERT LIGANSKY, ESQ., for Charging Party 
ROBERT PEREZ-WILSON, ESQ. (MARY J. O'CONNELL 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Norma Lemoine 
to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALT). After 
hearing, the ALT dismissed Lemoine's charge, which alleges that 
Local 1655, District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Local) violated 
§209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it refused to proceed to arbitration on six grievances which 
Lemoine had filed against her employer. The ALT concluded that 
Lemoine had not established that the Local's decision to not 
arbitrate her grievances was arbitrary, discriminatory or made in 
bad faith. 
The arguments made in support of Lemoine7s exceptions are 
essentially the same as the ones she made to the ALT and, as did 
the ALT, we find them without merit. 
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Lemoine alleges that the Local breached its duty of fair 
representation because she was not permitted to consult either 
with the Local's executive board, which made the decision not to 
proceed to arbitration, or the Local's attorney, who reviewed the 
grievances and opined to the executive board that the grievances 
were all without merit or otherwise unworthy of proceeding to 
arbitration. 
No matter how important an individual may consider his or 
her grievances, there is no statutory right to require the union 
to accept and process to arbitration any particular employee 
grievance nor is there any statutory right to determine the means 
by which the union investigates and evaluates a grievance. No 
per se theory of violation can be premised upon a union's failure 
or refusal to consult with the employee in a particular fashion 
before making decisions about the prosecution of those 
grievances. To hold otherwise would unreasonably and 
unnecessarily interfere with the union's internal affairs and 
would deny the union the wide range of reasonableness to which it 
is entitled in determining whether and how it will process 
grievances.-7 
Lemoine also again alleges that the Local breached its duty 
of fair representation because Judy Lawrence, Lemoine's immediate 
supervisor, and one of the members of the executive board who 
-
7See, e.g., City Employees Union Local 237, 20 PERB 53042 
(1987) . 
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participated in the deliberations on her grievances, was the 
person against whom several of Lemoine's grievances were 
directed. We again reject any theory of per se violation with 
respect to Lawrence's participation in the executive board's 
deliberations for the same reasons we rejected a per se theory 
with respect to Lemoine's consultation allegations. On the facts 
of this case, there is no evidence that Lawrence was biased 
against Lemoine, had prejudged the merits of any of her 
grievances or had adversely influenced the executive board's 
vote. Indeed, as the ALJ noted, Lawrence was one of the two 
executive board members who voted in favor of arbitrating 
Lemoine's grievances. 
Lemoine also notes in her exceptions that the Local had 
originally voted to take her grievances to arbitration. It is 
unclear to us whether this is intended to be a separate basis for 
exception or whether Lemoine mentions this only in the context of 
her exceptions which are directed to the Local's failure to 
consult with her. To the extent Lemoine intends the former, we 
deny the exception. The record in this respect shows that the 
executive board had not actually voted to accept Lemoine's 
grievances for arbitration at its May 11 meeting. Although the 
consensus of the executive board at that time may have favored 
arbitration, the members of the executive board deferred to a 
request made by the Local's president that they first read her 
grievances and permitted him an opportunity to again consult with 
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the Local's attorney before they actually voted. A union's duty 
of fair representation does not prohibit it from reconsidering a 
decision in circumstances in which it is persuaded in good faith 
that its initial decision warrants further review. As with the 
rest of Lemoine's exceptions, we find nothing persuasive in the 
record to evidence the Local's bad faith in the decision to not 
take her grievances to arbitration. 
For the reasons set forth above, Lemoine's exceptions are 
denied, the ALJ's decision is affirmed and the charge is 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: February 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
/j^^X^^xjC tltrvVt/fL 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
A^to. f^-Zl 
W a l t e r L. E i s e n b e r g , Membe 
E r i c jJSf^Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DEPEW POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
- a n d — Case No. U-11098 
VILLAGE OF DEPEW, 
Respondent. 
WYSSLING, SCHWAN & MONTGOMERY (W. JAMES SCHWAN of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
MAHONEY, BERG & SARGENT (NICHOLAS J. SARGENT of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Village of 
Depew (Village) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALT) on a charge filed against the Village by the Depew Police 
Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA). The ALT held that the 
Village violated §209-a.l(a) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it prohibited officers and members of 
the PBA from conducting a particular fund raiser and threatened 
them with suspension from their jobs if the fund raiser were 
held. 
Several of the Village's exceptions concern the extent to 
which the Chief of Police, John T. Maccarone, had either granted 
Board - U-11098 
-2 
or withheld permission for PBA events in the past pursuant to two 
departmental rules.-1 
In another part of its exceptions, the Village challenges 
the ALJ's finding that Maccarone did not act out of an interest 
to uphold the police department's integrity, but out of a 
personal interest to avoid looking "bad" to the unit employees 
because he had disciplined the employee on whose behalf the fund 
raiser was to be held. 
The Village argues in its last exceptions that the PBA fund 
raiser was not protected activity and, therefore, the Village was 
free to prohibit the event and to threaten the employees with 
suspension were one to be held. 
For the reasons which follow, we affirm the ALJ's finding 
that the Village violated §209-a.l(a) of the Act. 
-'Article XI, Rule 78 of the police department's Rules of 
Conduct prohibits: 
Seeking or soliciting contributions of any kind from 
anyone, by any means, for any purpose, under any 
circumstances, including collections for charitable 
purposes by any member, group of members or their 
agent, except as specifically authorized by the Chief 
of Police. 
Article XI, Rule 81 prohibits: 
Giving any gift, present or gratuity to another 
Department member, or a member of his family without 
the specific approval of the Chief of Police, excluding 
donation not to exceed five dollars given in honor of 
retirement or to hospitalized or deceased members, 
provided approval of the Chief of Police is obtained 
for the donations. Party, dinner and entertainment 
fees will be paid for individually by persons attending 
without prior collection through Department channels. 
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This case presents issues about an employer's right to 
regulate through the employment relationship the conduct of its 
employees as union members. It is beyond any dispute that 
employees have the protected right to participate freely in the 
legitimate affairs of their chosen bargaining agent without 
suffering job-related consequences for such participation. The 
right is not so absolute, however, as to permit for no 
examination of the nature of the union activity, the manner in 
which it is carried out or the employer's legitimate interests in 
regulating the activity. As with many of the issues which arise 
under the Act, we believe that the correct approach to the 
disposition of this question necessitates a balance of employee, 
union and employer rights and interests, subject, of course, to 
the provisions of the Act. 
An example drawn in part from this case is illustrative. 
The Village would violate the Act if it were to invoke its 
departmental rules to prohibit the PBA from soliciting its own 
membership for money to offset costs it or a member incurred in 
collective negotiations, contract administration or grievance 
adjustment. These form the core of a bargaining agent's 
statutory responsibilities and their availability is one of the 
fundamental reasons employees choose to be represented by a 
union. An employer has no legitimate interest in the regulation 
of such conduct, and any interference with such activity, whether 
or not pursuant to departmental rule, would be a per se violation 
of §209-a.l(a) of the Act. At the other extreme, we can identify 
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legitimate employer interests which might permit the Village to 
regulate a police officer's personal solicitation of Village 
residents to support PBA-sponsored causes or activities which are 
unrelated to the PBA duties as the bargaining agent. 
We have no need in this case to attempt to define the outer 
limits of an employer's permissible regulation of union activity 
because the fund raiser proposed by the PBA is that type of 
activity which an employer may not prohibit. The PBA's fund 
raiser was instituted at the request of a unit employee, William 
Gummo, who had been brought up on disciplinary charges by 
Maccarone. Its purpose was to raise money to assist Gummo with 
the expenses he had incurred in the defense of those disciplinary 
charges. Therefore, the fund raiser directly involved Gummo's 
statutory right to be represented by the PBA on the grievance and 
the PBA-'s corresponding right to represent him. As proposed to 
Maccarone, the fund raiser was to be held off premises, by 
officers out of uniform, open to anyone who purchased a ticket, 
and without solicitation of individuals for donations. We cannot 
identify in this type of union activity, nor has the Village 
pointed to, any legitimate employer interests which would even 
arguably permit the Village to either prohibit it or threaten 
employees with suspension if they were to hold it. 
Maccarone's prior conduct pursuant to the departmental rules 
and his motivation for refusing to permit the fund raiser are 
immaterial to this analysis. To the extent that the departmental 
rules conflict ,;with rights under the Act, the rules are invalid 
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as applied to this fund raiser. Consequently, they do not afford 
the Village any source of right in defense of Maccarone's 
conduct. Even if Maccarone's motivation were as he described, 
and not as the ALT found, the prohibition of the fund raiser 
would still be improper under the Act. The fund raiser as 
proposed simply would not have compromised any of the 
department's legitimate interests. 
As to the Village's argument that the courts have recognized 
the validity of certain no-solicitation rules, we simply note, as 
did the ALJ, that the circumstances in the cases cited by the 
Village-'' were materially different from those here and that the 
decisions did not address the statutory questions presented to 
us. As such, we do not consider the courts' decisions to be 
dispositive. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed and the Village's exceptions are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Village: 
1. Cease and desist from preventing the PBA fund raiser as 
proposed on behalf of William Gummo; 
2. Cease and desist from threatening PBA officers or unit 
employees with suspension if such a fund raiser were to 
be held; 
g/McGuire v. Krane, 48 N.Y.2d 661 (1979); Petri v. Milhim, 
136 A.D.2d 641 (2d Dep't 1988); Marano v. Incorporated Village of 
Lake Success, 86 Misc.2d 936 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1976). 
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3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
ordinarily used to post informational notices to unit 
employees. 
DATED: February 25, 1992 
Albany/ New York 
^ ^ m. 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLOYE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees of the Village of Depew (Village) in the 
unit represented by the Depew Police Benevolent Association, Inc 
(PBA), that the Village: 
lo Will not prevent the PBA fund raiser as 
proposed on behalf of William Gummo;' and 
2\ Will not threaten PBA officers or unit 
employees with suspension if such a fund 
raiser were to be held. 
VILLAGE. .OF. .DEPEW. 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, ORLEANS COUNTY 
LOCAL 837, ORLEANS COUNTY EMPLOYEE UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11827 
COUNTY OF ORLEANS, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (WILLIAM A. HERBERT Of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
HARTER, SECREST & EMERY (ERIC A. EVANS of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of 
Orleans (County) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) that the County violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when, as charged by the 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, Orleans County Local 837, Orleans County Employee Unit 
(CSEA), it terminated the employment of Richard Townsend. The 
County argues that there is insufficient record evidence that 
Townsend's termination was caused by his exercise of rights 
protected by the Act, and that by finding to the contrary, the 
ALJ incorrectly shifted to the County the burden to prove a 
legitimate business reason or disprove pretext. 
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CSEA, in cross-exceptions, objects to the ALT's remedial 
order as too limited. It seeks an order requiring the County to 
cease and desist from discriminating against other employees who 
engage in any protected activity, to give individual notice to 
unit employees of the violation found and to give County 
supervisors written notice of the unit employees7 rights under 
the Act. 
In its response to the County's exceptions, CSEA argues that 
the ALT correctly held that it had established a prima facie 
violation of the Act which was not successfully rebutted. The 
County argues, in response to CSEA's exceptions, that the ALT's 
remedial order is correct, assuming her finding of violation is 
affirmed. 
The parties do not take exception to the ALT's findings of 
fact in any material respect. We adopt and incorporate those 
findings and provide only a brief background description of the 
circumstances which led to the charge being filed. 
On March 29, 1990, Townsend met with CSEA's labor relations 
specialist and the local CSEA president to discuss a possible 
grievance. Pease was aware of their meeting and watched as they 
entered the room. 
On April 2, 1990, CSEA filed a grievance objecting to a 
suspension the County imposed on Townsend stemming from an 
incident which involved an alleged theft of money. On March 21, 
1990, Townsend and two other County employees found a check and 
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cash in a suitcase that presumably belonged to a County 
Commissioner. One of the other employees took the cash and 
stated he "would take care of it later." Townsend took the check 
and soon after handed it to his immediate supervisor. Later, the 
employee who had taken the cash gave Townsend some of it. 
Townsend then went to the office of Jack Pease, Administrator of 
the Orleans County Nursing Home where the incident had occurred, 
gave him his share of the cash, and explained what had happened. 
The other two employees turned in their share of the money when 
confronted by their supervisors. 
Later that day, Pease met with other County officials to 
discuss the incident, and it was decided that all three 
employees, including Townsend, would be suspended for fifteen 
days for their parts in the incident. Pease did not then think 
t 
that Townsend, although a provisional employee, should be 
terminated. 
The following day, Townsend appeared at a meeting with 
Pease, other County officials and Ann Harrold, CSEA's vice-
president, and was given by Pease a written statement regarding 
the incident and the County's proposed discipline. Harrold and 
Townsend discussed the matter and thereafter informed County 
officials that they disagreed with its version of the incident. 
On April 6, 199 0, Townsend was terminated at Pease's 
direction. 
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DISCUSSION 
It is well settled that to prove a case of improper 
interference or discrimination against an individual under the 
Act, a charging party must show that the affected individual was 
engaged in protected activity, that such activity was known to 
the person or persons making the adverse employment decision, and 
that the action would not have been taken "but for" the protected 
activity.^7 In its exceptions, the County argues only that CSEA 
failed from the facts as found by the ALJ to prove a prima facie 
violation because the necessary "but for" causation is not 
established. 
We disagree with the County on this issue both as a matter 
of fact and law. The County is incorrect in its factual 
assertion that the ALJ relied exclusively upon evidence of 
pretext in concluding that it had violated the Act. In finding 
that CSEA estbalished a prima facie violation, the ALJ relied 
.upon, inter alia, the timing of the County's decision, Townsend's 
work record, the County's change in its first announced 
disciplinary action, statements by the County's agents about what 
it had not considered in deciding to discharge him, and 
statements about the consequences for Townsend's refusal to 
accept a suspension. It is our conclusion that these facts were 
sufficient to establish, prima facie, the requisite "but for" 
-
/Seer e.g. , City of Salamanca, 18 PERB [^3012 (1985) . 
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causation, thus shifting to the County the burden to explain its 
actions. 
We also disagree with the County's legal proposition that we 
may not consider evidence of pretext as part of a charging 
party's case on causation. We are unaware of any decision in 
which we have so held and the County does not cite us to any. 
The pretextual nature of an employer's reasons for an employment 
action may be a proper part of a charging party's case simply 
because proof of pretext may support the allegation that the 
action was taken because of the employee's exercise of protected 
right. The ALT in a given case may not ultimately adopt an 
inference of impropriety from this, but that does not mean that 
pretext evidence can only rebut an employer's defense of 
"legitimate business reason." Such a holding would deny a 
charging party an opportunity to introduce relevant evidence or 
to have it considered except in those cases in which a respondent 
put forth a defense of business justification.-7 
It is our finding that the ALJ's conclusion that Townsend 
was terminated because he engaged in protected activity is 
supported by the record, and that the ALJ's decision should be 
affirmed in this respect. 
-
7The ALJ has discretion to control the order of proof to 
promote an orderly and expeditious hearing. We hold only that 
evidence of pretext in support of a prima facie violation is 
admissible regardless of the respondent's defenses. 
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In its cross-exceptions, CSEA asserts that the ALJ's order 
should be modified to require the County to cease and desist from 
interfering with or discriminating against all of its employees. 
The ALT ordered in this respect only that the County cease and 
desist from terminating Richard Townsend because he filed a 
grievance on April 2, 1990. 
We recognize that we have often ordered an employer to cease 
and desist from discriminatory practices generally upon a finding 
that the employer has in some way interfered with or 
discriminated against an employee because that employee exercised 
protected rights. CSEA's exception gives us the opportunity to 
examine this practice. 
Section 213 of the Act provides a procedure for the judicial 
review and enforcement of PERB's final orders. This enforcement 
mechanism and the respondent's right to be held accountable only 
for those violations charged necessitate that our orders be 
limited to the facts reflected in the record, be stated with as 
much specificity as is reasonably possible, and be tailored to 
meet the particular circumstances of the proceeding. A broad 
cease and desist order raises difficulties in subsequent 
enforcement proceedings involving facts unlike and unrelated to 
those originally charged. In an enforcement proceeding brought 
under a broad cease and desist order, the court could assume the 
role of finder of fact, becoming a labor tribunal of first 
instance, forced to make the very factual determinations which 
^ 
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§205.5(d) of the Act expressly vests in PERB. As this case 
concerns only the discriminatory discharge of Townsend, the ALT 
properly issued a narrow order prohibiting the County from 
discharging Townsend because he filed a grievance. Townsend's 
reinstatement with back pay fully remedies the action actually 
taken by the County and the narrow cease and desist order still 
permits reasonable notice to unit employees of the nature of the 
violation found against the County and of their statutory rights 
and the County's duties in relevant respects. We conclude that a 
cease and desist order which is not directed to the specific 
conduct found to violate the Act is generally not necessary and 
should be avoided in the interest of minimizing problems in 
enforcement and contempt proceedings brought on subsequent 
developments unrelated to the matter which gave rise to the 
original charge. Accordingly, we dismiss CSEA's exception which 
is directed to the scope of the ALJ's cease and desist order. 
We also reject CSEA's request for an order requiring the 
3 
County to give either individual notice to unit employees or to 
notify its supervisory employees in writing as to their 
obligations under the Act. Our policy is to require, in most 
cases, the prominent posting of a notice of violation to ensure 
that affected persons have knowledge of their rights and 
obligations under the Act.-7 There being no evidence in this 
case to indicate that a posting is inadequate, we will not 
-'See City Univ. of New York, 2 3 PERB 53 011 (1990) . 
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deviate from this policy by requiring extraordinary means of 
communication of rights and duties. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County: 
1. Forthwith offer Richard Townsend reinstatement to his 
former position; 
2. Make Townsend whole for any loss of pay and benefits 
suffered by reason of his termination from the date 
thereof to the effective date of the offer of 
reinstatement less any earnings derived from employment 
in the interim, with interest at the maximum current 
legal rate; 
3. Cease and desist from terminating Richard Townsend from 
employment because he filed a grievance On April 2, 
1990; 
4. Sign and post a notice in the form attached at all 
locations ordinarily used to post informational notices 
to unit employees. 
DATED: February 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
"WiA^Tkdlv. 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
<-t-~ 2r+ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member^ 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we-hereby notify
 a l l employees in the unit represented by CSEA, Inc. 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Orleans County Local 837, Orleans 
County Employee Unit, that the County of Orleans will': 
1. Forthwith offer Richard Tpwnsend 
reinstatement to his former position; 
•2. Make Townsend whole for any loss of pay and 
benefits suffered by reason of his 
termination from the date thereof to the 
effective date of the offer of reinstatement 
less any earnings derived from employment in 
the interim, with interest at the maximum 
current legal rate; and 
3. Not terminate Richard Townsend from 
employment because he filed a grievance on 
April 2, 1990. 
COUNTY OF ORLEANS 
Dated. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GLENS PALLS POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
and- CASE NO. U-12196 
CITY OF GLENS FALLS, 
Respondent. 
GRASSO AND GRASSO, ESQS. (JANE K. FININ of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
McPHILLIPS, FITZGERALD & MEYER, ESQS. (JAMES E. CULLUM 
of counsel), for Respondent 
') BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of 
Glens Falls (City) to a decision by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director). On a charge 
filed by the Glens Falls Police Benevolent Association (PBA), the 
Director held that the City had violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
eliminated its practice of giving unit employees a credit for 
retirement purposes for police service performed for other 
municipalities. 
In finding a violation, the Director rejected the City's 
jurisdictional defense which rests on a theory that the charge 
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raises, at best, a contract violation which lies beyond our power 
to entertain pursuant to §2 05.5(d) of the Act.-7 
In its exceptions, the City renews its jurisdictional claim 
and it otherwise excepts to the Director's conclusion that a past 
practice regarding retirement credits for service for other 
municipalities ever existed or was discontinued. The PBA argues 
in its response that the Director's decision is correct and 
should be affirmed. 
As we find that the charge is beyond our jurisdiction under 
§205.5(d) of the Act, the Director's decision must be reversed. 
Although it was not clear from the charge as filed that 
there was a jurisdictional question raised by the PBA's 
allegations, that became apparent during the two days of hearing 
conducted by the Director. As the jurisdictional question raised 
by §205.5(d) of the Act relates to our power to entertain an 
improper practice charge, we are required to reach that issue 
whenever and however it comes to our attention and to dismiss any 
charge at any stage of the proceedings when we are persuaded that 
the charge lies beyond our jurisdiction. 
-That section of the Act provides, in relevant part, that 
the board shall not have authority to enforce 
an agreement between an employer and an 
employee organization and shall not exercise 
jurisdiction over an alleged violation of such 
an agreement that would not otherwise 
constitute an improper employer or employee 
organization practice. 
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From the testimony of the PBA's own witnesses, and other 
evidence that it presented during the hearing, it is clear that 
the PBA alleges that the City agreed to give unit employees 
service credit for retirement purposes in the context of an 
agreement to a 2 0-year retirement plan option that was 
incorporated into the parties' 1989-91 contract that was in 
effect when the charge was filed. Assuming there had been a 
practice regarding service credits, it became, from the PBA's 
perspective, a matter of contract right when the 1989-91 contract 
was settled. In this respect, we do not agree with the 
Director's conclusion that the parties' discussions during 
negotiations were merely proof of the City's practice. We read 
the record to establish an allegation by PBA that during those 
negotiations it reached an agreement with the City that employees 
would be eligible for the 2 0-year plan because those who needed 
credit for service in other municipalities to reach the requisite 
years of service would receive those credits. Based upon that 
allegation, from that point forward the source of the City's 
obligation was no longer based on a practice but on a contract. 
As we are without power under §205.5(d) of the Act to 
entertain or to remedy alleged contract violations, the charge 
must be dismissed. Having decided to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction, we do not consider any of the City's other 
exceptions. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
M.L,'fLX*rk 
Paul ine R. K m s e l l a , Chairperson 
Walter L. E i senberg , Menfcer 
Er i c J/T Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROBERT REESE, JR., 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-123-24 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
ROBERT REESE, JR., 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-12325 
STATE OF NEW YORK (ROCKLAND PSYCHIATRIC 
CENTER), 
Respondent. 
ROBERT REESE, pro se 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (MARILYN S. DYMOND of counsel) 
for Respondent in U-12324 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, ESQ., for Respondent in U-12325 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by Robert Reese, 
Jr., to two decisions issued by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director). Reese's first charge, 
filed against the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. 
(CSEA), alleges that CSEA violated §209-a.2(a) and (c) of the 
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Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it inadequately 
investigated his layoff by his employer, the State of New York 
(Rockland Psychiatric Center) (State) and condoned allegedly 
racist supervisory actions in conjunction with the layoff. The 
Director dismissed the charge against CSEA as deficient because, 
as filed and later amended, it did not set forth any facts which 
would establish that CSEA had breached its duty of fair 
representation. The Director held that Reese's allegations 
against CSEA were entirely conclusory and in many respects 
untimely. Moreover, he held that Reese's burden to plead facts 
in support of his allegations was not satisfied simply by the 
submission of "myriad" documents. 
The Director also dismissed Reese's second charge which he 
filed against the State. This charge alleges, as amended, that 
the State laid him off from work "in a racist way" and because he 
was "trying to be involved with the union . . . ." The Director 
dismissed the charge against the State on the ground that we have 
no jurisdiction over an employer's allegedly racially motivated 
actions and because there were no facts alleged which would 
evidence that the State's conduct was taken for reasons 
prohibited by the Act. 
In his exceptions, Reese again alleges that his layoff was 
racially motivated and he points to certain statements from a 
CSEA officer as reported in a local newspaper as proof of that 
allegation. As the Director correctly stated, however, we do not 
have jurisdiction over allegations that an employer has 
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discriminated against individuals because of their race. At the 
State level, such allegations are within the jurisdiction of the 
State Division of Human Rights. Therefore, we may not consider 
whether Reese's allegations of racial discrimination were 
adequately supported by the materials he filed with the Director. 
Even if his allegations in this respect were true, we still would 
not be able to find any violation of the Act against the State on 
that basis. 
Reese also alleges that the Director failed to investigate 
his allegations of racial discrimination and similarly failed to 
investigate certain individuals within the State and CSEA who 
allegedly had information relevant to his claim that his layoff 
was racially motivated. This exception is denied for two 
reasons. First, as noted, the racial discrimination allegation 
is not within our jurisdiction. Second, to whatever extent 
Reese's allegations could be read to state an improper employer 
or union practice within our jurisdiction, it was his duty to 
properly plead and support his allegations. As the agency which 
adjudicates allegations of statutory impropriety, PERB does not 
have any investigatory role. The Director, therefore, had no 
right or duty to investigate Reese's allegations or otherwise to 
present the charges for him. 
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Our review of the Director's decisions is limited to the 
records as they were developed before him.-7 Those records do 
not show that Reese was denied a fair chance to state or prove a 
statutory cause of action which we could entertain. To the 
contrary, Reese was given extensions of time and other 
opportunities to respond to and correct the noted deficiencies in 
his charges. Having failed to correct the stated deficiencies, 
the Director correctly dismissed the charges. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are denied 
and the Director's decisions are affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charges must be, and 
hereby are, dismissed.-7 
DATED: February 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
-'Reese's submission to us of other information has not been 
considered because it was not before the Director, was not newly 
discovered and because certain of the information was submitted 
in letters Reese filed with us after he and the other parties 
were notified that the exceptions were complete. 
-
7Chairperson Kinsella did not participate. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ONONDAGA-CORTLAND-MADISON BOARD OF 
COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL SERVICES, 
Charging Party/ 
-and- CASE NO. U-12540 
ONONDAGA-CORTLAND-MADISON BOCES 
FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, NYSUT, 
AFT #2897, 
Respondent. 
REBECCA STREIB, for Charging Party 
HELEN BEALE, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Onondaga-
Cortland-Madison Board of Cooperative Educational Services 
(BOCES) to the dismissal by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) of the charge it filed 
against the Madison BOCES Federation of Teachers, NYSUT, 
AFT #2897 (Federation). BOCES' charge alleges that the 
Federation violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it refused to abide by or sought to add 
a condition to an agreement which was allegedly reached between 
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the parties in settlement of an earlier improper practice charge 
which the Federation had filed against BOCES.-7 
Relying upon our decision in Local 1170 of the 
Communications Workers of America-7 (hereinafter CWA), the 
Director held that the processes which lead to the settlement of 
an improper practice charge do not constitute the type of 
negotiations to which any statutory duty to negotiate in good 
faith pertains. 
CWA involved a party's refusal to execute a disciplinary 
grievance settlement. We there held that the duty to negotiate 
in good faith, as defined in §2 04.3 of the Act and as enforced 
through the Act's refusal to bargain provisions, was intended to 
apply only to those discussions which arise in the context of 
negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement. The 
rationale which led us to this conclusion in CWA is equally 
applicable to this case. We cannot discern any material 
distinction favorable to the BOCES between grievance settlement 
discussions and improper practice settlement discussions for the 
purpose of establishing a cause of action under §209-a.2(b) of 
-The Federation has sought to continue the processing of that 
charge because the BOCES would not agree that the parties' 
settlement was enforceable under the grievance procedures of their 
collective bargaining agreement. 
^23 PERB f3004 (1990). 
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the Act. The Director correctly dismissed the instant charge as 
legally deficient.-7 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision is 
affirmed, BOCES' exceptions are denied and the charge is hereby 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: February 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
%kJik*A. 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
/AtMZ- r. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric .J*: Schmertz, Member!/ 
/ 
-
7By this holding, we do not suggest that there is no 
remedy for a wrongful breach of an improper practice charge 
settlement. The remedies may include applications to this Board 
for reestablishment of the original improper practice charge and/or 
for enforcement of the improper practice charge settlement 
agreement or such judicial action as the Court may deem 
appropriate. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of the 
EASTPORT SCHOOL UNIT, SUFFOLK 
EDUCATIONAL LOCAL 87 0, CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, and SUFFOLK EDUCATIONAL 
LOCAL 87 0, CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES Case No. D-0249 
ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO,-and CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, 
Respondents, 
upon the Charge of Violation of 
§210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On September 14, 1990, Alan D. Oshrin, Chief Legal Officer 
for the Eastport Union Free School District filed a charge 
alleging that the Eastport School Unit, Suffolk Educational Local 
870, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, and Suffolk Educational Local 870, Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, and Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, had 
violated Section 210.1 of the Civil Service Law (CSL) in that the 
Respondents caused, instigated, encouraged or condoned a strike 
against the Eastport Union Free School District on August 15, 1990. 
The Respondents requested PERB's Counsel to recommend to this 
Board that Respondents' dues and agency shop fee deduction 
privileges be suspended for a period of two months.- The 
-' The penalty is based upon the conduct of the Eastport 
School Unit, Suffolk Educational Local 870, Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. 
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charging party has no objection to this proposed penalty. 
Upon the understanding that Counsel would recommend, and 
this Board would accept that penalty, the Respondents withdrew 
their answer to the charge. Counsel has so recommended. We 
determine that the recommended penalty is a reasonable one and is 
consistent with the policies of the Act. 
WE ORDER that the dues and agency shop fee deduction rights 
of the Eastport School Unit, Suffolk Educational Local 870, Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
and Suffolk Educational Local 870, Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, and Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
be suspended, commencing at the first practicable date, and 
continuing for a period of two months. Thereafter, no dues or 
agency shop fees shall be deducted on their behalf by the 
Eastport Union Free School District until the Respondents affirm 
that they no longer assert the right to strike against any 
government as required by the provisions of CSL §210.3(g). 
DATED: February 25, 19 9 2 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and-- CASE NO. C-3816 
TOWN OF ROSENDALE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the .Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employeed in the title of Dispatcher, 
Police Officer, Investigator and Sergeant. 
Excluded: The Chief of Police and all other employees of 
the employer. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other-terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: February 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 182, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3879 
TOWN OF WEST TURIN, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 182, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All laborers employed in the Highway 
Department. 
Excluded: Clerical employees, Superintendent of Highways 
and all other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 182, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages^ hours7 and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: February 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
uline R. Kinsella, Pa Chairperson 
UWz^r 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
Schmertz, Memberv 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION 
AFL-CIO, LOCAL 200-C, 
Petitioner, - -
-and- CASE NO. C-3890 
TOWN OF RIDGEWAY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Service Employees 
International Union, AFL-CIO, Local 200-C has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Motor Equipment Operators 
. Excluded: Management and Office Employees 
Certification - C-3890 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Service Employees 
International Union, AFL-CIO, Local 200-C. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages-, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: February 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
^LL:jg-J^4u 
Pauline R. Kihsella, Chairperson 
X 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric 3/ Schmertz, Member \J 
